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The Challenges of EU Integration:  
Iberian Lessons for Eastern Europe 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
After decades of relative isolation under authoritarian regimes, the success of processes 
of democratic transition in Portugal and Spain in the second half of the 1970s paved the 
way for full membership in the European Community. For Spain, Portugal, and their 
European Community (EC) partners this momentous and long awaited development had 
profound consequences and set in motion complex processes of adjustment.
i 
 
There was no dispute that the Iberian countries belonged to Europe. This was not just 
a geographical fact. Spain and Portugal shared their traditions, their culture, their religion, 
and their intellectual values with the rest of Europe. Moreover, both countries had 
historically contributed to the Christian occidental conceptions of mankind and society 
dominant in Europe. Without Portugal and Spain the European identity would only be a 
reflection of an incomplete body. Iberian countries belonged to Europe. Their entry into 
the European Community was a reaffirmation of that fact, and it would enable both 
countries to recover their own cultural identity, lost since the Treaty of Utrecht, if not 
before. 
 
The Iberian enlargement strengthened Europe’s strategic position in the Mediterranean 
and Latin America, and led to the further development of a European system of cohesion 
and solidarity. Spain and Portugal offered a new geo-political dimension to the Union, 
strengthening it southwards, and ensuring closer ties with other regions that have been 
peripheral to the EC This process was fostered with the Spanish accession to NATO on 
June 1982, after a long controversy within the country.
ii 
 
The purpose of this paper is to use the experience of Portugal and Spain in the 
European Union (EU) as an opportunity to reflect on what has happened to both countries 
since 1986 and draw some lessons from the Iberian experiences that may be applicable to 
Eastern European countries. This paper will identify the basic changes in the economies 
and societies of Portugal and Spain that occurred as a result of European integration. 
 
Entry to the EC has brought many benefits to both countries. In sixteen years Portugal 
and Spain have successfully turned around the unfavorable conditions of the accession 
treaties (particularly for Spain). EU membership has improved the access of both 
countries to the European common policies and the EU budget. At the same time 
Portugal and Spain's trade with the Community has expanded dramatically over the past 
fifteen years, and foreign investment has flooded in. One of the main consequences of 
these developments has been a reduction in the economic differentials that separated each 
country from the European average. Since 1986, Portugal's average per capita income has 
grown from 56 percent of the EU average to about 74 percent, while Spain's has grown to   2
81 percent. The culmination of this process was the participation of both countries as 
original founders of European Monetary Union in 1999.  
 
From the standpoint of European policy, EC membership mattered to Spain and 
Portugal because the EC's decisions affected directly the Iberian countries. Indeed, some 
of the decisions adopted by the EC had an even greater impact over these economies than 
some decisions of their national administrations. In this regard, entry into the EC has 
allowed both countries to have influence on decisions taken at the European level, which 
affected both countries, and over which before accession they had little influence, and in 
any case, no voting power. Since their accession, Portugal and Spain have played an 
important role in the process of European integration and have become again key actors 
in the European arena. At the same time, they have contributed decisively to the 
development of an institutional design of the European Union that has been largely 
beneficial to their interests. Finally, Portugal and Spain have participated successfully in 
the development and implementation of the Single Market and the European Monetary 
Union (EMU). 
 
The process of integration into Europe has also influenced cultural developments. As 
part of their democratic transitions and European integration, both countries attempted to 
come to terms with their own identities, while addressing issues such as culture, 
nationality, citizenship, ethnicity, and politics. At the dawn of the new millennium it 
would not be an exaggeration to say that the Spaniards and the Portuguese have become 
"mainstream Europeans," and that many of the cultural differences that separated these 
two countries from their European counterparts have dwindled as a consequence of the 
integration process. 
 
EU integration, however, has also brought significant costs in terms of economic 
adjustment, loss of sovereignty, and cultural homogenization. In addition, accession has 
also brought more integration but also fears (exacerbated by issues such as size, culture, 
and nationalism). 
 
At a time when European countries are on the threshold of major changes, with an 
ambitious plan to integrate the economies of central and Eastern Europe, the lessons 
derived from analysis of the Spanish and Portuguese experiences should be instructive to 
scholars, students, and policymakers working on expansion and integration issues. 
Moreover, the examination of these two cases will shed new light on the challenges (and 
opportunities) that less developed countries face when trying to integrate regionally or 
into the global economy. 
 
The paper proceeds in three steps. I analyze first the consequences of the EU 
integration for the Iberian countries. In the following section, I examine the challenges 
presented by the ongoing enlargement of the EU for Portugal and Spain. The paper closes 
with some lessons for Eastern European countries. A central argument will be that 
political considerations were key in the decision by Spain and Portugal to join the EC.   3
 
CONSEQUENCES OF EU INTEGRATION 
 
Political and Sociological Consequences 
 
A central argument of this paper is that EU membership was decided on the basis of 
political rather than economic considerations. Nearly forty years of authoritarianism, 
which kept both Iberian countries in the margins of the process of European integration, 
increased further their desire to become part of the EC. Indeed, in the second half of the 
past century, the European Community epitomized in the eyes of the Portuguese and 
Spanish citizens the values of liberty, democracy, and progress absent in both countries. In 
the words of a famous Spanish philosopher, Ortega y Gasset, ‘Spain is the problem and 
Europe the solution.’ In addition, Iberian entrepreneurs knew that their only future lay in 
Europe. Belonging to the European club was a mission not to be questioned. After years of 
relative isolationism, both countries finally joined the European integration process in the 
expectation that it would help consolidate their newly established democratic institutions, 
modernize their outdated economic structures and finally, normalize relations with their 
European neighbors. 
 
Over the last sixteen years Portugal and Spain have undergone profound 
transformations. The democratic regimes installed in the 1970s have lasted far longer and 
attained a greater degree of stability than earlier democratic episodes in both countries. 
EC membership finally ended the political isolation of both Iberian countries. As one 
illustrious Spanish intellectual stated: 
 
“For the last two centuries Spain has practically been neutralized in the 
international field. Having our country ceased to be an active element in the 
process of world history, we Spaniards have lost, not just the necessary 
mental habits, but also the very notion of sharing our destiny in the march 
of the Universal History.”
iii 
 
Indeed, EC membership paved the way for the complete incorporation of both 
countries into the major international structures of Europe and the West, as well as the 
normalization of Portugal and Spain’s relations with their European partners. Portugal 
and Spain have become, again, important players in Europe. At the domestic level, 
Portugal and Spain undertook deep processes of institutional, social, and cultural reforms. 
Hence, from a political standpoint EU integration has been an unmitigated success, as 
both countries have consolidated their democratic regimes and institutions. The two 
processes—European integration and democratization—are thoroughly intertwined.  
 
The EC (and international pressures in general) were unquestionably important in this 
development.
iv When the European Community was founded, it pledged to protect the 
principles of peace and liberty. Whatever other difficulties or problems may arise, this 
was the fundamental objective of the Community. Given this commitment, the still young 
democracies of Spain and Portugal needed to be given a positive answer regarding their 
integration. Otherwise, there would be the risk of weakening these new democracies that   4
Europe had committed to defend. This objective was clearly stated by European leaders, 
“the accession of Spain to the Community emanates from a political purpose, aiming at 
the stability, the consolidation and the defence of the democratic system in Europe.”
v The 
European Commission itself recognized the fact that the integration to the EC was 
essentially a political choice. The opening of the negotiations was an explicit recognition 
that major changes had taken place in Spain and Portugal, which needed to be protected 
and consolidated within the European context. In other words, the political, economic and 
social stability of Portugal and Spain were perceived as stability factors for the 
Community itself.
vi  
 
In Portugal and Spain, integration was viewed by the political and economic elites as 
the best way to consolidate the fragile structures of Iberian democracies, and therefore, 
Europeanization and democratization were considered complementary processes. Formal 
accession negotiations to enlarge the EC began with Portugal in October 1978 and with 
Spain in February 1979. Accession was viewed as a mean to consolidate political and 
economic reforms in both countries. After almost forty years of authoritarianism and very 
little democratic experience, democracy was still uncertain in Iberia. In Spain, the failed 
coup d'état led from Colonel Tejero on February of 1981 was a rude awakening to the 
reality of the fragility of the new democratic regime. In Portugal the instability and 
uncertainties surrounding the failed revolutionary attempt of the 1970s highlighted the 
precariousness of the democratization process. The lessons from both experiences were 
very important for both countries. Portugal and Spain still had to go a long way to 
strengthen their democratic reforms and institutions. On the other hand, the Spanish 
king’s firm stance in favor of democracy, as well as the rejection by the overwhelming 
majority of the population of Tejero’s attempt, offered good perspectives for the newborn 
democracy. In Portugal the excesses and instability of the revolutionary period, provided 
warnings about the potential pitfalls of a transition gone adrift. In this context Portugal 
and Spain’s application to the EC sought to strengthen their young democratic processes. 
Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that the underlying reasons for the integration of 
Portugal and Spain in the EC were mostly political. Political forces were particularly 
dominant in shaping the direction of events in the enlargement as well as in determining 
the terms of accession.  In many cases not only the general public but also many political 
parties had not fully grasped the full economic consequences of the integration.
vii 
 
Some scholars have theorized on the influences that European integration has had on 
the Iberian democratization processes focusing on its symbolic impact (i.e. “the 
identification of EU with liberal democracy and political freedom”), the pressures 
induced by the democratization pre-requisite for membership; the effect of membership 
prospects on domestic policies and policy direction; and finally, the involvement of 
political and economic elites in European institutions during negotiations as well as their 
participation in European transnational networks.
viii  
 
In the Iberian cases the EC played a significant role in the success of this process. In 
addition to the EC’s demonstrative and symbolic influence due to the EC association with 
democracy and freedoms, the EC had important indirect levers, particularly during the 
negotiations for accession, to influence the direction of events and the decisions of   5
policymakers and economic actors (i.e., economic incentives). During the early phases of 
the democratization processes, the most important lever was, obviously, the democratic 
precondition for EC entry. Brussels defined explicitly the institutional conditions that 
would satisfy this requirement and European leaders made them very explicit to the 
Iberian leaders. According to Pridham these conditions included: “the inauguration of 
free elections; the predominance of parties supportive of liberal democracy; the existence 
of a constitution; and evidence of a reasonably stable government led, if possible, by a 
political figure known and approved in European circles.”
ix European leaders stated that 
accession negotiations would not proceed and the application from these countries would 
not be considered as long as these countries did not demonstrate significant progress in 
these areas.  
 
In addition, the repetitive refusals to consider the Spanish application for membership 
during the Franco and Salazar/Caetano years, strengthened the positions of opposition 
groups and economic actors supporting democracy. They used EC membership as an 
additional inducement to support democratization and convince the Portuguese and 
Spanish people of the potential benefits of membership. In addition, democratization 
processes received explicit support from the EC. Following the failed coup d’etat of 1981 
the European Parliament (and many European leaders) passed a resolution condemning it 
and expressing support for Spanish democracy. The message was loud and clear: the 
success of the coup would have resulted in the immediate cancellation of the accession 
negotiations. The decision to proceed with negotiations, was therefore the ultimate lever 
in the hands of the EC to push for democratization in both countries. In Portugal, 
following the revolution of April 1974, European governments exerted considerable 
bilateral pressures to follow through the democratization process.
x These developments 
obviously had an impact on Portuguese and Spanish economic and political actors during 
the transition and contributed to the consolidation of the new democratic regimes. 
Finally, the Iberian leaders used the fragile and unstable situation of their countries as 
leverage to push forward the accession process and to obtain financial and institutional 
support from the European governments, which they used to strengthen their domestic 
position, as well legitimize the system and the new democratic institutions.  
 
EC membership has also contributed to the consolidation of the Iberian democratic 
regimes.
xi Pridham argues that membership has had the following impact: First, it helped 
link “enhanced national self-image with possible feelings for democracy.” In addition, 
financial contributions from the EC budget as well as the economic benefits of 
membership (i.e. FDI), contributed to improve economic conditions and mitigated some 
of the negative effects of liberalization and modernization of the outdated economic 
structures of both countries. In turn, improved economic conditions and better prospects 
for social and political stability influenced public opinion and helped to legitimize the 
new system and to strengthen support for democracy. Membership also forced the Iberian 
countries to align their institutions to the acquis communautaire, which reinforced 
democratic practices and induced democratic governments to push for administrative 
reforms and decentralization. (for instance, Portugal reformed its Constitution in 1989 to 
allow for reprivatization of companies that had been nationalized during the revolution). 
Finally, membership also promoted elite socialization and the development of   6
transnational networks, which, for instance proved vital for the strengthening of interest 
groups and political parties (such as the Spanish and Portuguese Socialist parties, which 
received substantive support from their European counterparts). The development of 
economic interests and networks at the European level also strengthened the support of 
economic actors for democracy.   
 
The EC, however, lacked the direct intervention instruments (such as armed 
intervention) that could have had a systemic effect on the Iberian democratization 
processes. Hence, it is essential to look at interactions between the international 
environment and domestic politics. The actors involved in the transition had the powers 
to influence events and, hence, they were the ones that ultimately determined the final 
outcomes. Domestic dynamics, are thus, critical. The process of European integration 
interacted with a wide variety of domestic social, political, and economic factors that 
shaped the new democracies. In Spain a radical and unparalleled process of devolution to 
the autonomous regions has led to a decentralized state that has culminated with the 
development of the State of Autonomies.
xii In Portugal, following the collapse of the 
revolutionary attempt, the state also undertook a systemic process of modernization. 
However, the two transitions were substantially different. In Portugal, the road to 
democracy started with a clear break, the coup of April 25, 1974. In Spain, on the 
contrary, the transition was more consensus-oriented. These two paths to democracy 
(among other factors) have resulted in enduring differences in the two Iberian 
democracies in terms of institutional developments (i.e., in Portugal, a decentralization 
attempt was defeated in a referendum), economic performance (i.e., Spain has 
experienced higher levels of unemployment), and collective life (i.e., support for unions 
and political parties is higher in Portugal than Spain, or differences in labor participation 
rates). Indeed, European integration has not eliminated major differences between the 
Iberian countries In addition, integration cannot explain the broader patterns of political 
transformation with its clearly identifiable underpinnings in the two countries. These 
enduring differences illustrate the limitations of research attempts that have sought to 
causally link the Iberian democratic transitions to internationally rooted and domestically 
supported pressures for European integration.  In the end, as it has been correctly stated 
by Fishman (2001:8) “the political motivations guiding their assessment of Europe during 
the crucial years leading up to EC membership were strongly shaped by the Iberian’s held 
attitudes toward democracy and regime transition, attitudes formed within the context of 
the distinctive political experience of each case”  
 
From a sociological standpoint EU membership has also resulted in attitudinal changes 
that have influenced the political culture of both countries. From the beginning there was 
strong support from public opinion and elites for the integration of both countries into 
Europe as a means to consolidate the new democratic regimes. They viewed 
democratization and European integration as part of the same process. Hence, successive 
governments in both Portugal and Spain associated European integration with the 
modernization of their countries and this helped shift public opinion’s attitudes to wards 
their governments and democracy. In addition, other scholars have noted that by allowing 
for the active involvements of both countries in European institutions, European 
integration contributed to change the ‘isolationist-fatalist attitude’ of the political   7
classes.
xiii Public opinion surveys from Eurobarometer and Madrid’s Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas have showed a sustained increase in positive ratings effects 
for the functioning of democracy.  Support for the relationship between the Iberian 
countries and the EU has been widespread in both countries since 1986 despite 
fluctuations. This almost unanimous consensus in favour of integration into Europe 
seems to be the consequence of Portugal and Spain’s need to overcome their historical 
isolation from the rest of Europe since the nineteenth century until the end of the 
authoritarian regimes in 1970s. This development contributed to the legitimating of the 
new democratic system (and thus the consolidation of democracy).  
 
However, the greatest consensus elicited toward the EU is instrumental (particularly in 
Spain), with levels of diffuse affective support for the EU being low, although high in 
comparative perspective. The polling data collected by the Madrid’s Center of 
Sociological Investigations (CIS) and Eurobarometer show that Portuguese and 
Spaniards feel linked by geographical and affective feelings to Europe and the 
Europeans. However, they do not identify closely with a so-called “common European 
culture.” The reason for this is that despite a shared history and traditions, there is an 
absence of a pre-modern common past and a European heritage that would have allowed 
for the emergence of a unified European identity. Therefore, the image of a “European 
community” among Iberian people is very week. Indeed, they perceive the EU as an 
economic community, not so much as a community of Europeans. The Eurobarometer 
and CIS polling data show that the perceptions from Iberian citizens about the personal 
and collective benefits derived from EU membership are one of the key factors that help 
explain for their attitudes towards the process of European integration.  Consequently, it 
is not surprising that polling data show that Portuguese and Spaniards have a utilitarian 
and instrumentalist concept of the EU—i.e. they evaluate the consequences of 
membership over issues such as living costs, infrastructures, job opportunities, wages, 
etc. Iberian citizens develop an implicit cost/benefit analysis and based on this evaluation 
adopt a position in favor or against European integration. Hence, approval of Europe 
seems to coincide with the economic cycles: low during economic recessions, and high 
during periods of economic growth. Finally, when comparing the attitudes of Spanish and 
Portuguese citizens’ vis-à-vis other European citizens the former support the EU more, 
but also stress further the need to build a social Europe.
xiv 
 
Table : Support for EU, EMU, CFSP, and Enlargement 
 EU 
Membership 
is Good 
Trust the 
European 
Commission 
Support 
EMU 
Support 
CFP 
Support 
CSP 
Support 
New 
Members 
Spain 63  62  68  68  76  58 
Portugal 61  52  57  57  71  52 
Source: Eurobarometer, October-November 2000. 
 
Finally, it is important to stress that in terms of political behavior, EU membership has 
not transformed activism and political participation In Portugal or Spain. Levels of 
support for democracy as a legitimate political regime, preferably to any other alternative, 
have usually remained high (around 80 percent of the responses in surveys), and   8
Portuguese and Spaniards declare themselves satisfied with the functioning of 
democracy. Yet, political cynicism continues to be a major component of political 
attitudes and the political behavior of Portuguese and Spanish citizens. These countries 
still have the lowest levels of participation of Western Europe and membership in 
political and civic associations remains very low. At the same time, citizens do not have a 
feeling of political influence and express strong sense of ambivalence towards political 
parties and the political class, which is translated into a rather low interest in politics.
xv 
 
 
Economic and Social Consequences 
 
Economic conditions in Spain and Portugal in the second half of the 1970s and first half 
of the 1980s were not buoyant. The world crisis caused by the second oil shock in the late 
1970s and the lack of adequate response from the collapsing authoritarian regimes in both 
countries intensified the structural problems of these economies. Portugal had been a 
founding member of EFTA and had lowered its trade barriers earlier, and was 
theoretically in a better position than Spain. However, Salazar did even less than Franco 
to encourage entrepreneurship and competition. This factor combined with the costs of 
the colonial wars, and the disruptions caused by the revolution and near a decade of 
political upheaval dramatically worsened the economic situation. For instance, in the 
1960s Portugal’s income per head was about three quarters that of Spain, and in the late 
1980s it was only one-half. By the time of accession Spain was the EC’s fifth-largest 
economy, and Portugal its tenth.
xvi  
 
The economic crisis of the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s had devastating 
consequences in both countries and made any additional adjustments caused by the 
accession to the EC a daunting prospect. In Spain the high unemployment levels, which 
reached 22 percent on 1986, suggested that any additional adjustment cost would have 
painful consequences.
xvii In addition, the country was unprepared for accession-i.e., 
Spanish custom duties remained on the average five times higher than the EC’s and EC 
products faced a major disadvantage in the Spanish market because the country had a 
compensatory tax system and restrictive administrative practices that penalized harder 
imported products.
xviii Slow license delivery was common, and constructors that sold 
vehicles in the county did not have import quotas to introduce cars into Spain from 
abroad.  Finally, when Spain and Portugal called to the door of the EC for accession in 
1977, protectionist institutions-which were incompatible with EC rules-were still fully 
operative in both countries. For instance, the Spanish government controlled through the 
I.N.I (National Institute of Industry) a considerable size of the economy, and subsidized 
public enterprises such as the auto making companies (SEAT, ENASA), as well as the 
metallurgic, chemical, ship construction and electronic sectors. This situation provided a 
considerable advantage for Spanish manufacturers, which were highly protected from 
foreign competition. 
 
In this context, EU integration was a catalyst for the final conversion of the Iberian 
countries into modern Western-type economies. Indeed, one of the key consequences of 
their entry into Europe has been that membership has facilitated the modernization of the   9
Iberian economies
xix. This is not to say, however, that membership was the only reason 
for this development. The economic liberalization, trade integration, and modernization 
of these economies started in the 1950s and 1960s and both countries became 
increasingly prosperous over the two decades prior to EU accession.  
 
The economic impact of the EC started long before accession. The Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs) between the EC and Spain (1970) and the EC and Portugal (1972), 
resulted in the further opening of European markets to the latter countries, which paved 
the way for a model of development and industrialization that could also be based on 
exports. The perspective of EU membership acted as an essential motivational factor that 
influenced the actions of policymakers and businesses in both countries. Henceforth, both 
countries took unilateral measures in preparation for accession including increasing 
economic flexibility, industrial restructuring, the adoption of the VAT, and intensifying 
trade liberalization. Through the European Investment Bank they also received European 
aid (Spain since 1981) to mitigate some of the expected adjustment costs (for instance on 
fisheries).  
 
In addition, the actual accession of both countries after 1986 forced the political and 
economic actors to adopt economic policies and business strategies consistent with 
membership and the acquis communautaire (which included the custom union, the VAT, 
the Common Agriculture and Fisheries Polices, and the external trade agreements; and 
later the Single Market, the ERM, and the European Monetary Union).  
 
EU membership also facilitated the micro and macro economic reforms that 
successive Iberian governments undertook throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In a context 
of strong support among Iberian citizens for integration, membership became a 
facilitating mechanism that allowed the Iberian governments to prioritize economic rather 
than social modernization and hence, to pursue difficult economic and social policies 
(i.e., to reform their labor and financial markets), with short-term painful effects. 
Moreover, the decision to comply with the EMU Maastricht Treaty criteria led to the 
implementation of macro and microeconomic policies that resulted in fiscal 
consolidation, central bank independence, and wage moderation. 
 
Nevertheless, the process of EC integration, also brought significant costs in terms of 
economic adjustment, and loss of sovereignty. Under the terms of the accession 
agreement signed in 1985 both countries had to undertake significant steps to align their 
legislation on industrial, agriculture, economic, and financial polices to that of the 
European Community. These accession agreements also established significant transition 
periods to cushion the negative effects of integration. This meant that both countries had 
to phase in tariffs and prices, and approve tax changes (including the establishment of a 
VAT) that the rest of the Community had already put in place. This process also 
involved, in a second phase, the removal of technical barriers to trade. These 
requirements brought significant adjustment costs to both economies.  
 
Since 1986 the Portuguese and Spanish economies have undergone profound 
economic changes. EU membership has led to policy and institutional reforms in the  10
following economic areas: monetary and exchange rate policies (first independent 
coordination, followed by accession to the ERM, and finally EMU membership); reform 
of the tax system (i.e. the introduction of the VAT, and reduction of import duties); and a 
fiscal consolidation process. These changes have led to deep processes of structural 
reforms aimed at macroeconomic stability and the strengthening of competitiveness of 
the productive sector. On the supply side, these reforms sought the development of well-
functioning capital markets, the promotion of efficiency in public services, and the 
enhancement of flexibility in the labor market. As a result markets and prices for a 
number of goods and services have been deregulated and liberalized; the labor market has 
been the subject of limited deregulatory reforms; a privatization program was started in 
the early 1980s to roll back the presence of the government in the economies of both 
countries and to increase the overall efficiency of the system; and competition policy was 
adapted to EU regulations. In sum, from an economic standpoint the combined impetuses 
of European integration and economic modernization have resulted in the following 
outcomes: 
 
Figure 1: The Iberian Economic Transformation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of static effects, EC accession has resulted on trade creation in the 
manufacturing sector. Indeed, it has had dramatic effects in trade patterns.
xx As a matter 
of fact, in the early 1980s the Spanish economy was the least open to industrial trade of 
any of the EC members. Hence, the participation in a custom union like the EC, has 
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resulted in the dismantling of trade barriers for the other members of the union. Trade 
liberalization also exposed the highly protected and non-competitive sectors of the 
economy to foreign competition.
xxi  
 
Some EC products already had preferential access to the Portuguese and Spanish 
market as a result of the 1972 and 1970 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). Trade 
creation was reasonably expected given the high level of protection (particularly in 
Spain) before accession to the EC as well as the similarity of the structure of industry in 
Portugal, Spain, and the EC.
xxii Accession did not have negative consequences on non-EC 
suppliers because Spain and Portugal’s tariffs on non-EC imports were aligned to the 
common external tariff, which in general was much lower than Iberian tariffs on non-EC 
imports prior to accession. Furthermore, as a result of the 1970 and 1972 PTAs Spain and 
Portugal had already benefited from a substantial cut in the external Common Customs 
Tariff, therefore Iberian exports to the EC did not have discriminatory effects on other 
non-EC suppliers. Finally, the opening of the Portuguese and Spanish markets has led to 
an increase of intra-industry trade, and hence less acute labor adjustments problems. 
 
At the same time, however, for the Iberian manufacturers accession to the Community 
has also resulted in more competition. Since Portuguese and Spanish nominal tariffs 
averaged 10-20 percent before EC entry, and generally speaking manufacturing EC 
products were cheaper and more competitive, membership has resulted in an increase of 
imports from the EC and therefore, on a worsening in the balance of current account (and 
the closure of many industrial enterprises in Iberia). The intensity of the adjustment, 
however, has been mitigated by the behavior of exchange rates and by the dramatic 
increase in the levels of investment in these two countries. Spain and Portugal have been 
attractive production bases since they both offered access to a large market of 48 million 
people, and a well-educated and cheap−compared with the EC standards−labor base.  In 
the end, the transitional periods adopted in the treaty to alleviate these adjustment 
problems and the financial support received from the EC played a very important role 
minimizing the costs for the sectors involved.  
 
Portugal and Spain had benefited from their Preferential Trade Agreements with the 
EC on manufacturing products.  However, these agreements left both countries outside of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). While the composition of GDP had changed 
significantly in both countries throughout the 1960s, in the 1970s agriculture was still a 
critical sector for the Portuguese and Spanish economies with more that 10 million 
people−17 percent of the population−living from it in Spain. Spanish agriculture 
accounted for 9 percent of GDP and its agricultural output was 16.5 percent of the 
Community total.  In Portugal the share of agriculture represented 16 percent in 1973 
(down from 23 percent in 1961).  
 
The Iberian governments (particularly the Spanish one), however, were much more 
effective in achieving reasonable compromises in the manufacturing sector during the 
accession negotiations, than they were in the agricultural sector. Arguably, this might 
have happened because in the industrial sector the governments had to satisfy their 
workers (an important electoral constituency), as well as the union, which were well  12
organized and had influence in the ruling parties. On the contrary, Iberian farmers 
(particularly in Spain) were not so well organized and hence were not as effective 
pressuring for a better agreement. It is also true that on agriculture some EC members, 
particularly France, held more intransigent positions during the negotiations. 
 
The integration of Spain and Portugal in the EC offered opportunities for both trade 
creation and trade diversion in agriculture.  Since Spain and Portugal had been kept out of 
the CAP before accession, EC membership gave better access conditions to Iberian 
agricultural exports to the Community.  This was particularly true given the good quality 
of these products and their lower prices−compared with those of the EC. At the same 
time, the increase of Portuguese and Spanish agricultural exports to the Community 
displaced imports from other countries. The main source of adjustment problems was 
trade creation because greater import penetration led to a contraction in domestic 
production. For Spain one of the main challenges of accession was the result of the 
regional diversity of its agriculture because it has not been easy for farmers affected by 
the CAP to switch to other products given the differences in the environment, weather, 
and fertility conditions.
xxiii From an agricultural standpoint the fears of trade diversion 
materialized to some extent after accession (in favor of other EU members such as Italy, 
or France), which contributed to increasing migration from rural areas to the cities. 
 
At the time of accession, it was considered that a critical factor to determine the final 
outcome of integration would depend upon the pattern of investment, which would bring 
about important dynamics effects. Spain and Portugal had a number of attractions as a 
production base including; good infrastructure, and educated and cheap labor force, and 
access to markets with a growing potential. In addition, EC entry would add the incentive 
of further access to the EC countries for non-EC Iberian investors−i.e. Japan or the U.S. 
As expected, one of the key outcomes of integration has been a dramatic increase in 
foreign direct investment, from less than 2% to more than 6% of GDP over the last 
decade. This development has been the result of the following processes: economic 
integration, larger potential growth, lower exchange rate risk, lower economic 
uncertainty, and institutional reforms. EU membership has also resulted in more tourism 
(which has become one of the main sources of income for Spain).  
 
Another significant dynamic effect has been the strengthening of Iberian firms' 
competitive position. As a result of enlargement Iberian producers gained access the 
European market, which provided additional incentives for investment and allowed for 
the development of economies of scale, resulting in increasing competitiveness. By the 
1980s Spain and Portugal were already facing increasing competition for their main 
exports−clothing, textiles, leather-from countries in the Far East and Latin America, 
which produced all these goods at a cheaper costs exploiting their low wages. As a result 
of this development, the latter countries were attracting foreign investment in sectors 
were traditionally Portugal Spain had been favored. This situation convinced the Iberian 
leaders that their countries had to shift toward more capital-intensive industries requiring 
greater skills in the labor force but relying on standard technology−e.g. chemicals, 
vehicles, steel and metal manufacturers.  In this regard, Portugal and Spain’s entry to the 
EC facilitated this shift.  Both countries gained access to the EC market, thus attracting  13
investment that would help build these new industries. Finally, Portugal and Spain also 
benefited from the EU financial assistance programs−i.e., the European Regional 
Development Fund, the Social Fund, the Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and 
the new created Integrated Mediterranean Program for agriculture, and later on from the 
Cohesion Funds. 
 
EU integration has also allowed both economies to become integrated internationally 
and to modernize, thus securing convergence in nominal terms with Europe. One of the 
major gains of financial liberalization, the significant decline in real interest rates, has 
permitted Portugal and Spain to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. Indeed, over 
three years ago, on January 1
st, 1999 Spain and Portugal became founding members of 
the European Monetary Union. At the end, both countries, which as late as 1997 were 
considered outside candidates for joining the euro-zone, fulfilled the inflation, interest 
rates, debt, exchange rate, and public deficit requirements established by the Maastricht 
Treaty. This development confirmed the nominal convergence of both countries with the 
rest of the EU. 
 
Table 1: Compliance of the EMU Convergence Criteria for Portugal, 1986-1997 
   1986 1990 1996 1997 
Inflation* %  13.1  13.6  2.9  1.9 
General Government Deficit  % GDP  6.4  5.6  3.2  2.5 
General Government Gross Debt  % GDP  68.0  66.9  65.0  61.4 
Long-term Interest rates  %  19.5  16.8  8.6  6.4 
*1986 and 1990: CPI; 1996 and 1997: HCPI (Harmonized Consumer Price Index). 
Sources: European Commission and Portuguese Government. 
 
 
Table 2: Compliance of the EMU Convergence Criteria for Spain, 1993-1997 
Year Inflation 
(% growth) 
Long-Term 
Interest rate 
Public Sector 
Deficit 
(as % of GDP) 
Government 
Debt 
(as % of GDP) 
1993  4.6 10.2  6.9 60.0 
1994  4.7 10.0  6.3 62.6 
1995  4.7 11.3  7.3 65.5 
1996  3.6 8.7 4.6 70.1 
1997  1.9 6.4 2.6 68.8 
Source: Commission and EMU Reports, March 1998. 
 
The EU contributed significantly to this development. Art. 2 of the Treaty of 
Rome established that the common market would "promote throughout the Community a 
harmonious development of economic activities" and therefore lower disparities among 
regions. While regional disparities of the original EC members were not striking (with the 
exception of Southern Italy), successive enlargements increased regional disparities with 
regard to per capita income, employment, education, productivity, and infrastructure. 
Regional differences led to a north-south divide, which motivated the development of EC 
structural policies. The election of Jacques Delors in 1985 as president of the  14
Commission led to renewed efforts to address these imbalances. They culminated in the 
establishment of new cohesion policies that were enshrined in the 1986 Single European 
Act, which introduced new provisions making economic and social cohesion a new EU 
common policy. In this regard, the regional development policy emerged as an instrument 
of solidarity between some Europeans and others. Since the late 1980s the structural 
funds became the second largest EU's budgetary item. These funds have had a significant 
impact in relationship to the investment needs of poorer EU countries (see Table 3) and 
have made an impressive contribution to growth in aggregate demand in these countries 
(see table 4): 
 
Table 3: Gross Fixed Capital Formation versus Community Support Frameworks 
  Percent GFCF Due to EU 
Support 
Percent of GFCF vs. CSFs* 
  1989 1993 1989 1993 
Portugal  7.7 9.9 20.6  27.7 
Spain  2.9 4.1 5.8 8.0 
*CSFs include the private sector expenditures entered into the financing plan of the CSF 
Source: Kesselman et al., European Politics in Transition. Data: EC Commission, Fourth 
Annual Report on the Implementation of the Reform of the Structural Funds, 1992, Com 
(93) 530, Brussels, 29 October 1993, 84. 
 
Table 4: Estimated Annual impact of Structural Funds, 1989-1993 
  Average Annual Growth Rate (89-93)  Estimated Impact 
Spain 1.5  0.2 
Portugal 2.6  0.7 
Source: Kesselman et al., European Politics in Transition. Data: EC Commission, Fourth 
Annual Report on the Implementation of the Reform of the Structural Funds, 1992, Com 
(93) 530, Brussels, 29 October 1993, 84. 
 
Indeed, the structural and cohesion funds have been the instruments designed by the 
EU to develop social and cohesion policy within the European Union, in order to 
compensate for the efforts that countries with the lowest per capita income relative to the 
EU (Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain) would need to make to comply with the 
nominal convergence criteria. These funds, which amount to just over one-third of the 
EU budget, have contributed significantly to reduce regional disparities and foster 
convergence within the EU. As a result major infrastructure shortcomings have been 
addressed and road and telecommunication networks have improved dramatically both in 
quantity and quality. In addition, increasing spending on education and training have 
contributed to the upgrading of the labor force. In sum, these funds have played a 
prominent role in developing the factors that improve the competitiveness and determine 
the potential growth of the least developed regions of both countries.
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During the 1994-1999 period, EU aid accounted for 1.5% of GDP in Spain and 3.3% 
in Portugal. EU funding has allowed rates of public investment to remain relatively stable 
since the mid-1980s The percentage of public investment financed by EU funds has been 
rising since 1985, to reach average values of 42% for Portugal, and 15% for Spain.  15
Moreover, the European Commission has estimated that the impact of EU structural 
funds on GDP growth and employment has been significant: GDP rose in 1999 by 9.9% 
in Portugal and 3.1% in Spain. In the absence of these funds public investment will be 
greatly affected. 
 
Figure 2 : Percentage of public sector investment financed with EU funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sebastián 2001, p.28 
 
The combined impetuses of lowering trade barriers, the introduction of the VAT, 
the suppression of import tariffs, the adoption of economic policy rules (such as 
quality standards, or the harmonization of indirect taxes), and the increasing mobility 
of goods and factors of production that comes with greater economic integration, 
have boosted trade and enhanced the openness of the Portuguese and Spanish 
economies. After 1999, this development has been fostered by the lower cost of 
transactions and greater exchange rate stability associated with the single currency. 
For instance, imports of goods and services in real terms as a proportion of GDP rose 
sharply in Spain (to 13.6% in 1987 from 9.6% in 1984), while the share of exports 
shrank slightly (to 15.8% of GDP from 16.6% in 1984, and from 17.1% of real GDP 
in 1992 to 27% in 1997). As a result, the degree of openness of the Portuguese and 
Spanish economies has increased sharply over the last sixteen years. Henceforth, 
changes to the production structure and in the structure of exports, indicators of the 
degree of competitiveness of the Portuguese and Spanish economies (i.e., in terms of 
human capital skills, stock of capital, technological capital) show important 
improvements, although significant differences remain in comparison to the leading 
developed economies (which confirms the need to press ahead with the structural 
reforms). These achievements verify that in terms of economic stability Spain and 
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Portugal are part of Europe's rich club. Their income levels, however, remain behind 
the EU average: 
 
Table 5: Divergence of GDP per Capita 1980-2000 
  1980 1985 1990 2000 
EU Totals  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Spain 74.2  72.5  77.8  81.0 
Portugal 55.0  52.0  55.7  74.0 
 Source: European Union. 
 
This data shows that nominal convergence has advanced at a faster pace than real 
convergence. Indeed, ‘fifteen years have not been long enough.’ Portugal and Spain’s 
European integration has revealed both convergence and divergence, nominal and real. 
Since 1997 inflation in Spain has exceeded the EU average every year. In Portugal real 
convergence has been slowing down each year since 1998, actually turning negative in 
2000 and with both real and nominal divergence expected to increase until 2003. While 
there is significant controversy over the definition of real convergence, most scholars 
agree that a per capita GDP is a valid reference to measure the living standards of a 
country. This variable, however, has experienced a cyclical evolution in the Iberian 
countries with significant increases during periods of economic expansion and sharp 
decreases during economic recessions. Since the adhesion of Spain to the EU in 1986 per 
capita income has increased "only" 11.5 percent and Portugal's 14.2 percent. Ireland's, in 
contrast, has increased 38 percent. Only Greece with an increase of 6.8 percent has had a 
lower real convergence than Spain and Portugal. A possible explanation for this 
development has been the fact that while Spain has grown between 1990 and 1998 an 
average of 2.1%, Portugal has grown 2.5%, and Ireland 7.3% over the same period. This 
growth differential explains the divergences in real convergence. Other explanations 
include: the higher level of unemployment (15.4 percent in Spain); the low rate of labor 
participation (i.e., active population over total population, which stands at 50 percent, 
which means that expanding the Spanish labor participation rate to the EU average would 
increase per capita income to 98.2 percent of the EU average); the inadequate education 
of the labor force (i.e. only 28 percent of the Spanish potential labor force has at least a 
high school diploma, in contrast with the EU average of 56 percent); low investment in 
R&D and information technology (the lowest in the EU, with Spain ranked 61-spending 
even less proportionally than many developing countries including Vietnam-in the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Report of Information Technologies 20002-2003 ); and 
inadequate infrastructures (i.e. road mile per 1000 inhabitants in Spain is 47 percent of 
the EU average and railroads' 73 percent). The inadequate structure of the labor market 
with high dismissal costs, a relatively centralized collective bargaining system, and a 
system of unemployment benefits that guarantees income instead of fostering job search, 
have also hindered the convergence process.
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From a social standpoint, this was a decade and a half of political stability, associated 
with an overall strengthening of the State’s financial and budgetary capacity, and with a 
significant increase in social expenditures. The overall architecture of the system has 
been maintained but there was a substantive growth of the amount of benefits, with a  17
consequent upgrade of social standards, as well as a movement toward the 
institutionalization of social dialogue, with the signature of social pacts. For instance, in 
1980 expenditure on social protection was 18.1 percent of GDP in Spain and 12.8 percent 
of GDP in Portugal, much lower levels than the EU average at that time (24.3%) and only 
higher than that of Greece (9.7%). Since EU accession, despite an increase of 3.4 percent 
of the resources dedicated to social protection in Spain (the Spanish welfare state grew 
significantly in size during this period and expenditures on social protection over GDP 
increased by 50 percent), the differential with the EU average has not been reduced but 
has rather increased from 6.2 points in 1980 to 6.8 points in 1997. Portugal, starting from 
lower levels of social protection, has been more successful reducing the differential with 
the EU average by 50 percent. Spain, however, continues to show a higher intensity of 
protection (per capita expenditure on social protection) than that of Portugal In the end, 
the Portuguese and Spanish welfare states have undergone a deep process of change in 
qualitative terms, entailing both the introduction of several universal polices and a 
broader extension of tax-funded non-contributory benefits and services. At the same time, 
the need to transpose EEC’s regulatory framework, the acquis communautaire (i.e. in the 
fields of labor and working conditions, equality of treatment for women and men, free 
movement of workers and health, and safety at work), and the role played by the 
structural funds has contributed widely to this development. 
 
The 2004 Enlargement: Challenges for Portugal and Spain 
 
At the European Council meeting in Copenhagen on December 13, 2002, the EU threw 
open its doors to the East and concluded years of difficult negotiations with ten 
candidates: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. This historical summit is the last act in the reunification of 
eastern and western Europe following the end of the Cold War. In the near future, the EU 
will extend from Portugal to the borders of Russia (growing from 15 to 25 countries in 
2004, provided referenda in the candidate countries ratify the accession treaties), with a 
population of 451mn, a GDP of US$8,800bn, and a GDP per capita of US$21,410.
xxvi 
Not only is this enlargement process a historical event, but it is also unique. This is the 
largest single enlargement of the EU since it was established and, unlike the Greek and 
Iberian enlargements, covers former communist and totalitarian states where a civil 
society, independent institutions, a free press and an entrepreneurial class have been 
largely absent since the end of WWII. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
these countries have built, virtually from scratch, new social, political and economic 
institutions. This process, and the sacrifices involved, as in Iberia, has been supported by 
the prospect of joining Europe. Enlargement will have a significant impact on the Iberian 
countries, raising a number of policy and research issues. 
 
As we have seen, in sixteen years Portugal and Spain have been able to change the 
terms of accession and negotiate compensatory mechanisms to mitigate the negative 
consequences of unfavorable accession treaties (particularly for Spain). Ultimately, 
integration has had a very positive outcome and both countries have benefited greatly 
from European funds and policies. For instance, in 2001 Spain was allocated nearly 63% 
of the EU’s structural funds budget (US$27.8bn). Since the Iberian countries are major  18
beneficiaries of the EU’s redistributive funds, the entry of Central and Eastern European 
countries (some, like Poland, with large agricultural sectors) should result in a reduction 
of the resources currently received by Iberian countries from European funds. Structural 
and agricultural funds will be available, at least through 2006. After that year, however, a 
new scenario will open, characterized by increasing competition for European funds, 
foreign direct investment, trade and migration patterns. These developments should force 
the Spanish and Portuguese governments (as well as economic players) to re-evaluate 
current strategies and policies. Furthermore, enlargement will generate new demands 
from the Eastern European members in a context in which the richer countries are 
committed to maintain (or even, if possible, reduce) their existing budget ceilings, which 
currently stand at 1.27% of EU GDP. This will likely result in a shift of resources to the 
East, implying that both Portugal and Spain will receive less funds from the EU budget 
and that they will therefore make a greater financial contribution to the EU. 
 
At the same time, since the new member states are significantly poorer, enlargement 
will reduce the EU’s average gross domestic product per capita by between 10%-20%. 
Hence, Spain’s per capita income, and to a lesser extent Portugal’s, will be closer to the 
EU average (this is the so-called ‘statistical effect’). This means that many Iberian 
regions will no longer be eligible for aid, as funds are re-directed towards new member 
states. Under existing rules, only the regions with an average per capita income of less 
that 75% of the EU average (which includes practically all the regions of the new 
member states) qualify to receive structural funds as regions classes as Objective 1. In 
addition, only the countries with an average income of less than 90% of the European 
average have access to the Cohesion Fund (which would include all the new member 
countries (e.g., Poland, at 40%, Lithuania, at 36%, and Cyprus, at 78%). Regional funds 
currently represent 34.5% of the EU’s budget and CAP funds 45%. Hence, as a result of 
enlargement there will be three groups of countries. First, a group of poorer countries 
formed by eight of the ten new members (except Cyprus and Slovenia), with average per 
capita incomes of 42% of the EU average and 21% of its population. A second group will 
comprise five countries (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain) with an average 
per capita income of close to 90% of the EU average and 13% of its population. The last 
group will be integrated by the richer countries of the Union, with 66% of its population 
and an income of 115% of the EU average. 
 
Hence, many Iberian regions will not qualify for structural and cohesion funds. For 
instance, at present 11 of Spain’s 17 regions (Extremadura, Andalusia, Galicia, Asturias, 
Castile-León, Castile-La Mancha, Murcia, Valencia, Ceuta, Melilla and, under special 
conditions, Cantabria) receive EU structural funds because their per capita incomes are 
below the 75% threshold and, hence, are considered Objective 1 territories. After the 
2004 enlargement, however, only four Spanish regions (Andalusia-67.4%, Extremadura-
58.4%, Castile-La Mancha-73.6%, and Galicia-71.3%) will remain below 75% of the EU 
average income, allowing them to qualify for European funds in the same conditions. In 
addition, the expected entry of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 (the two poorest countries 
of the Union, with per capita incomes of respectively 27% and 26% of the EU average) 
will further raise the average of the current members, making only two regions qualify 
(Andalusia and Extremadura).
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The EU countries and the Commission are discussing mechanisms to allow for a 
progressive phasing out of these funds to prevent their sudden cancellation as a result of 
the ‘statistical effect’. The affected countries (including Spain and Portugal) are 
suggesting proposals to raise the ceiling above 75% to have access to the funds, or to 
establish different access criteria for current and new members. In the end, it is very 
likely that in the near future both Iberian countries (particularly Spain) will become net 
contributors to the EU budget. Hence, the political, electoral and budgetary implications 
of these developments are daunting and unprecedented. As we have seen, the European 
Commission has estimated that the impact of EU structural funds on GDP growth and 
employment has been significant: GDP rose in 1999 by 9.9% in Portugal and 3.1% in 
Spain. In the absence of these funds public investment will be greatly affected. 
 
Moreover, Spain and Portugal will have to further speed up the reform of their 
productive and economic structures to increase the productivity of their labor forces — 
still significantly lower than the EU average. As a result of the enlargement process, 
Portugal and Spain will face increasing competition for their main non-agricultural 
exports — such as clothing, textiles and leather. Problems should be expected in labor-
intensive industries given the relatively low wages in Central and Eastern European 
states, which produce all these goods at a cheaper cost. Therefore, these countries will 
attract foreign investment in sectors in which Portugal and Spain have traditionally been 
favored. Moreover, since the ten new members have lower labor costs it is likely that 
manufacturing plants currently producing in Iberia will be tempted to move to Eastern 
Europe (this is already happening: car manufacturer Seat moved a plant from Pamplona, 
Spain, to Slovakia in 2001). In this context, it will be important for the leaders of both 
Iberian countries to continue pushing for a shift towards more capital-intensive industries 
that require a more highly skilled labor force but rely on standard technology (e.g., 
chemicals, vehicles, steel and metal). 
 
Enlargement, paradoxically, may help in this process because it w i l l  a l s o  b r i n g  
significant opportunities to the Iberian countries (and other EU members). Indeed, 
Portuguese and Spanish products will now have access to new markets, which will 
provide access to cheaper labor and may help improve competitiveness. This could also 
allow the development of more diversified investment patterns, thereby reducing risks. 
Spanish (and to a lesser extent Portuguese) firms have invested very heavily in Latin 
America over the past decade. Current political and economic uncertainties in Latin 
America, however, suggest that diversification into Eastern and Central Europe might be 
the appropriate strategy for Iberian firms, which are still under-represented vis-à-vis 
companies from the larger EU countries (Spanish investment in these countries currently 
stands at a mere €200mn). 
 
In terms of the agricultural impact of enlargement, Iberian farmers should also expect 
to face serious adjustment problems, particularly as EU membership will imply the full 
applicability of the CAP to the ten new members and considering that agricultural prices 
in Central and Eastern Europe (especially Poland) are generally lower than in the Iberian 
Peninsula. Once the barriers for Eastern European agricultural produce come down, 
market prices in the Iberian Peninsula might decline given the new entrants’ lower prices  20
and their potential for expanding production. Furthermore, for some agricultural 
products, EU membership is expected to provide incentives to increase production in the 
new member states. Finally, the new member states’ markets will be opened to 
substitutes, thus resulting in surplus disposal that would have to be supported by the 
European budget. These concerns have been reflected in the final agreements. 
 
In the next decade CAP funds will be redesigned and most likely reduced. The EU 
leaders agreed in October 2002 to effectively freeze CAP spending until 2013 (it is 
supposed to increase merely 1% after 2006, well below inflation levels). Furthermore, in 
order to facilitate enlargement (and the WTO Doha world trade round), the European 
Commission proposed a plan in January 2003 to reform EU farming, including: the 
elimination of production-linked subsidies; the channeling of subsidies into rural 
development funds, the reduction of payments to big and medium-sized farms to achieve 
a fairer distribution, the cutting of payments to farmers if they fail to follow new criteria 
on food safety, environment and animal welfare and, finally, the lowering of prices at 
which the EU guarantees to buy up grain and dairy products. Spain and Portugal (among 
others, particularly France, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Austria) remain bitterly opposed to 
these plans. The reduction of the CAP’s funds for many Iberian farmers will most likely 
result in the co-financing of agricultural policies (something the Portuguese and Spanish 
governments have been unwilling to consider so far). 
 
In addition, EU enlargement will likely result in a shift towards the north, and the so-
called Mediterranean block (including Italy and Greece), which shares substantive 
similarities and interests, will carry less weight. Indeed, enlargement will shift the EU’s 
centre of gravity to the east and north, which will have economic and political 
implications for the Iberian countries, reducing the voting power of Portugal and Spain 
(and the Mediterranean bloc in general), while changing the EU’s cultural character. In a 
Europe of 25 members the institutional powers and influence of Spain and Portugal will 
be further diluted. First, Iberian votes will be less decisive in European institutions such 
as the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament. Secondly, and this is 
currently under consideration by the ongoing European Convention, enlargement is also 
likely to result in the extension of qualified majorities to additional policy areas that so 
far had to be decided by unanimity. Also, the shift in budgetary priorities and the limited 
resources will also mean that some of the policy priorities that Portugal and Spain have 
defended within the European Union, such as support for Latin America and North 
Africa-Maghreb, are likely to receive less attention and resources (and there is even the 
possibility that they may no longer be European policies).
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Finally, from an economic convergence standpoint, given the existing income and 
productivity differentials with the richer countries and regardless of enlargement, the 
Iberian states will have to continue raising their living standards to bring them closer to 
the current EU average. For this to happen, it is necessary for their economies to grow 
faster than the other rich European countries. This will require further liberalization of 
their labor structures (both internal and external), as well as increasing competition 
within their service markets and improving the utilization of their productive resources. 
Convergence will also demand institutional reforms in R&D policies, in education,  21
improvement of civil infrastructures, as well as further innovation, an increase in business 
capabilities, more investment in information technology and better and more efficient 
training systems. A successful convergence policy will also require a debate about the 
role of public investment and welfare programs in both countries. In the Iberian 
countries, increases in public expenditure to develop their welfare states have caused 
imbalances in their national accounts. Yet both countries still spend significantly less in 
this area than their European neighbors (i.e., Spain spends 6.3 points less in welfare 
policies than the EMU average). Effective real convergence would demand not only 
effective strategies and policies, but also a strong commitment on the part of Spanish and 
Portuguese citizens to achieve this objective. 
 
 
Challenges for the New Member States 
 
Political factors lay at the heart of the Portuguese and Spanish decision to join the EU. 
Both countries wanted to strengthen their new democratic regimes and end the relative 
isolation they had endured during their authoritarian years. Portugal, Spain and Greece 
demonstrate how important the democratic pre-requirement for membership has been to 
bring about and consolidate democratic regimes. Yet the differences between 1986 and 
2002 are remarkable. Portugal and Spain now have advanced capitalist economies, strong 
and modern states, social institutions that are supportive of markets, well-developed civil 
societies, trade unions and interest groups and a high degree of integration between the 
two Iberian economies that has resulted in a cluster of common interests. 
 
When we contrast this situation with the status of Eastern Europe and compare the 
challenges that the Iberian countries faced in the 1980s with those that the new states 
from Central and Eastern Europe will face, the latter look far more daunting. Central and 
Eastern Europe have barely functional market economies and unstable democracies. 
Furthermore, none of the new members has a previous tradition of democracy (except the 
Czech Republic). In the EU we now have a Single Market and EMU. Finally, the current 
economic and political climate (particularly after 9/11) will make enlargement even more 
difficult. Therefore, the current enlargement process is very different and far more 
problematic. 
 
As in Iberia, the new member states are transforming their political and economic 
systems, and have adapted their regulations to the acquis communautaire. However, the 
costs of this transformation for the new ten have so far been even higher than in Iberia. 
Unemployment has soared to 40% in some regions and taxes have risen by up to 10% as 
a result of the introduction of VAT. Economic and institutional transformations have 
exposed the weaknesses of these governments and in many cases have led to the return of 
former communists to power, hindering the reform process. 
 
Joining the EC was much simpler in 1986 than it is today. Since the 1986 Iberian 
enlargement the number of EU members has increased to 15, the Single Market and 
EMU have been introduced, and the Amsterdam and Nice treaties (with the incorporation 
of new policy areas such as justice and home affairs) have been ratified. Therefore, the  22
complexity of the acquis communautaire has increased dramatically  and hence the 
difficulties that new members are likely to face in order to meet it are much higher. 
Moreover, as other authors have noted, the differing cultural and historical experiences of 
the new entrants will complicate the convergence towards a common European 
identity.
xxix 
 
The economic and political environments are substantially different and even more 
complex. Indeed, the timing of accession was an important contributing factor to the 
success of Iberian integration. Not only did the Iberian countries have market economies 
with fully institutionalized market mechanisms already in place (bar the failed 
revolutionary attempt in Portugal in the mid 1970s), but the Iberian enlargement 
coincided with the end of the economic recession, the lowering of oil prices, the 
beginning of a period of economic expansion within the European economies and a new 
period of détente between the Soviet Union and the United States. Current economic and 
political uncertainties (the world-wide recession and the so-called war on terrorism, the 
conflict in the Middle East and the potential wars in Iraq and North Korea), combined 
with the economic difficulties affecting Germany and other EU member states (as well as 
the US and Japan) will make integration far more difficult for new members. 
 
There are also significant differences in economic performance in Eastern Europe. 
Given the scope of the new enlargement process and the disparities and geographical 
distance between the new entrants, harmonization is likely to be even more difficult. 
Some of these differences can be explained in terms of geographical proximity to the EU, 
but this factor does not explain everything. 
 
Domestically, the integration prospects for Eastern Europe are far more complicated. 
For the new members economic modernization will be the result of a systemic challenge, 
not merely the consequence of an adjustment process as in the Iberian countries. Hence, 
the economic benefits will be lower and will take longer to materialize. Moreover, 
increasing nationalism in these countries will also hinder the cultural effects of 
integration. The new member states will face problems similar to those of previous 
entrants. Cameron (2002) has argued that the new member states will face four major 
domestic challenges: first, the ability to reform their administrative and institutional 
settings to develop the capacity to implement the acquis; secondly, the willingness to 
deepen the necessary reforms to transform their economies into functional market 
systems; thirdly, the ability to reduce unemployment levels while addressing the 
structural imbalances of their economies; and, finally, the political challenges to finalize 
the transition to membership in the face of increasing opposition to enlargement within 
(and outside) their countries. 
 
The ten new entrants will have to reform nationalized industries, tackle corruption, 
strengthen their judicial systems and their administrative capacities to implement EU 
rules (e.g., on food safety), eliminate conflicting tax rules, eliminate political cronyism 
and politically-driven appointments to the civil service and public companies (there is 
widespread politicization of public-sector jobs), reform their public finances, strengthen 
their weak economic management, reduce industry subsidies, reform and in many cases  23
privatize their large and outmoded public companies (in Poland 2,000 state-owned 
companies generate a quarter of employment and GDP), introduce competition in many 
economic sectors, improve the overall business climate (by promoting privatization, fair 
taxation, deregulation and investment and limiting abuses to market power), strengthen 
financial regulation, develop transparent procurement procedures and uphold EU rules. 
One of the consequences of the concern over the ability of these countries to move ahead 
in these areas (and also an outcome of Greece’s integration experience) has been the 
inclusion of so-called safeguard clauses into the accession treaties to allow the EU to 
suspend privileges (such as structural funds and farm aid) in certain areas if the new 
member states breach Single Market rules. Moreover, EU enlargement will increase 
competition and force the liberalization of economic sectors in these states, and the CAP 
will bring not just subsidies but also more regulation and competition. Finally, the ability 
of the new member states to prepare viable projects to qualify for partial EU funding and 
to raise matching funds, will also determine their success in capitalizing from EU 
accession. 
 
The levels of financial support from European policies (cohesion and structural funds, 
or the CAP) will also be far more limited for the new member states than in previous 
enlargement processes. The new accession treaty provides €40.8bn in EU aid for the ten 
states for 2004-06 (and an additional 1bn for Poland from regional aid). This represents 
only 0.15% of the EU’s GDP. However, the figure is gross and the net transfer of funds 
will be even smaller after taking into account the contributions of the new member states 
to EU funds (which some analysts estimate could be as little as €12bn - or only just 4% of 
the EU budget and 0.05% of the EU’s GDP). Since the average per capita income of the 
new member states is 44% of the EU average and their GDP is only 5% of the EU’s, 
these funds will be hardly enough to help them close the gap: with this level of support it 
has been estimated that it will take over 20 years to do so. To put these figures in 
perspective, Greece has received more than €35bn from the EU since accession and 
during the 1994-99 period and EU aid accounted for 1.5% of Spain’s GDP and 3.3% of 
Portugal’s. 
 
These difficulties will be further aggravated by the fact that the new members’ farmers 
will have to wait until 2013 to receive the same level of support that farmers from current 
members receive (starting at 25% of current EU levels in 2004). This is critical for 
countries in which agriculture still represents a large proportion of their economies 
(58.9% of Poland’s surface area is devoted to agriculture and two out of ten Poles are 
farmers who contribute only 3.4% to the country’s GDP). This is a tough economic 
context in which two out of 10 Poles are unemployed, while in Slovenia and Lithuania 
unemployment is at 19.4% and 16.5%, respectively. In addition, public deficits are also at 
a high 5.6% of GDP in Slovakia and 5.5% in the Czech Republic. 
 
A key additional concern is the increasing growth of disenchantment regarding EU 
integration in the new member states. While a few years ago support was widespread and 
the assumption within the EU was that the biggest obstacles would come inside the 
existing union (according to Eurobarometer, in 2001 only 44% of Europeans supported 
enlargement and expressed concern over the costs of admitting the new states and fears  24
about labor migration), disillusionment over the accession conditions and the costs of the 
structural reforms necessary for EU membership, as well as fears of being swamped by 
foreign capital and influence, have led to increasing discontent among the citizens of the 
new members states, growing Euro-skepticism and the rise of anti-EU voices. Sensitive 
issues such as domestic affairs (e.g., high unemployment and the unpopularity of local 
governments), farm subsidies, Cyprus, immigration, the Benes decrees, the Sudetenland 
dispute or possible demands from former owners of property expropriated by the Nazis 
and Communists in some countries, have been further soured by the global economic 
slowdown and the accession conditions (particularly the decision to limit migration 
during the first seven years). According to Eurobarometer, support for enlargement is 
running at around 65% (ranging from 80% in Hungary and 60% in Poland to barely 50% 
in the Czech Republic), but given increasing political resentment, there is a serious risk 
that one (or more) of the prospective members might vote ‘No’ in the forthcoming 
accession referendums, particularly if voters decide to stay away from the polls. Approval 
is no longer a certainty.
xxx 
 
These challenges are compounded by the uncertainties over the course of the EU’s 
institutional reforms. The risk of an institutional decision-making gridlock is a real 
possibility. The logistics of ruling an institution with 25 members will be daunting. One 
of the key questions is what kind of institutional reforms will result from the ongoing 
European Convention. Some of the results of the convention could be: a more qualified 
majority voting (e.g., over issues such as taxation, justice and home affairs), EP co-
decision, a new EU presidential system to substitute the current six-month rotation 
among member states and an increasing role for national parliaments. While some of the 
larger countries (such as France and the UK) are pushing for a stronger EU presidency, 
the smaller states are in favor of a stronger European Commission, to act as an ally and 
protector. It will be in the best interests of the new members to uphold the current 
decision-making system based on consensus, as opposed to a majority vote, with a strong 
European Commission. Ultimately, the key will be to build a European Constitution that 
reflects the view of the peoples of Europe. Unfortunately, for decades most governments 
across Europe have been treating public opinion as an obstacle to be circumvented or 
simply ignored. Consequently, voter skepticism has grown and Europe’s are wearying of 
being told what to do by political elites in matters concerning the European Union. 
Politicians can ignore this at their own peril. 
 
Iberian Lessons for Post-Communist Europe 
xxxi 
 
The Iberian enlargement provides useful feedback for the current process, not only for 
negotiation strategies, but also as regards the consequences of membership.
xxxii What are 
the Iberian lessons for post-Communist Europe? 
 
First, any negotiations (even with the EU) should not be based on an ‘us against 
them’ approach but on a ‘them versus them’ stance, to allow the new member states to 
take advantage of divisions between current member countries. Poland has played this 
strategy quite skillfully so far. In addition, although the new members (like Portugal and 
Spain before) will find themselves on the same side on many issues (e.g., social  25
questions, EU structural funds and the concept of cohesion), each new member should 
develop its own ad hoc coalitions with other members based on common interests. The 
Iberian experience shows that despite similar interests and objectives, after sixteen years 
there has not been a consistent approach to EU negotiations between Portugal and Spain. 
They have often cooperated, but they have also worked separately and with other EU 
members. Portugal and Spain choose alliances depending on the issue at stake. 
 
Furthermore, one of the most important lessons from the Iberian enlargement is that 
the terms of accession are not always final. Renegotiations after accession are possible 
and compensatory mechanisms can be developed. Therefore, whatever the accession 
terms for 2004-06, the focus of the new member states should be on 2006, when the EU 
will start its next seven-year budget period.
xxxiii The focal point should be accession 
economics and not development economics. The EU will pursue stability and 
homogenization, but the new member countries will want growth. In this regard, the 
Iberian experience shows that the aim of the new entrants should be to find the best ways 
to maximize the benefits of membership once they are in. A nakedly selfish strategy that 
satisfies only particular needs is also bound to fail. The new members also need to look at 
their potential contribution to the EU and the model of European integration they want to 
build. Paraphrasing President Kennedy, they should ponder, not only what the EU can do 
for them but also what they can do for the EU. This should not be a zero-sum-game but 
instead a positive-sum-game. 
 
Thirdly, the experience of Portugal and Spain demonstrates the limits of peer pressure 
and the ability of the acquis communautaire to force change. The commission has 
pointed out in successive enlargement overviews of the new ten to the need to combat 
corruption and economic crime, strengthen independent judiciaries and develop the 
capacity to implement the acquis. However, both Spain and Portugal (and Greece) have 
encountered (and still do) problems in all of these areas. 
 
The Iberian enlargement also shows that patterns of migration can be reversed. Both 
Spain and Portugal were made to wait for accession in the 1980s, partly over immigration 
fears that never materialized. As in 1986, the new treaty of accession has established a 
period of seven years for the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe. Fears of 
uncontrolled migration were not substantiated after 1986 (or even after the seven-year 
transition period). On the contrary, as a result of improved economic conditions in the 
Iberian Peninsula, one of the key results of EU access was that by 1995 there were 
100,000 fewer Spaniards and 110,000 fewer Portuguese living in other EU member states 
than before enlargement. Furthermore, the reverse process took place, with thousands of 
Europeans (particularly from Germany and Britain) migrating to Spain. Such concerns 
are likely to prove to be unfounded again. 
 
The European Commission estimates that from 70,000 to 150,000 workers (of a 
population of 350 million) could migrate from Eastern Europe to the current EU states. 
This is hardly a large number. The continuing existence of language, cultural and 
structural barriers will most likely continue to hinder labor mobility in an enlarged 
Europe. In addition, the rapid economic growth of Eastern European countries  26
(particularly compared with some of the EU’s sclerotic members, such as Germany) is 
likely to have the same effect that it had on migration patterns in Spain and Portugal after 
1986. Finally, although it is likely that migration will cause difficulties in specific regions 
(especially on the eastern borders zones of Austria and Germany) and industries, the 
problem may not be excess migration from the east but too little. Given the EU’s ageing 
population and its low fertility rates it will be important to facilitate the migration of 
young people from Eastern Europe. In the end, instead of displacing local people from 
the labor market or lowering wages, immigrants from the new members states should 
contribute to the host country’s economy by adding value, creating jobs and pushing up 
wages because they will be able to work legally (as several hundred thousand workers are 
currently illegally in the EU).
xxxiv 
 
It is also necessary to note that the success of the Iberian countries was largely 
influenced by the support they received from EU funds. During 1994-99, EU aid 
accounted for 1.5% of Spain’s GDP and 3.3% of Portugal’s. EU funding has allowed 
rates of public investment to remain relatively stable since the mid-1980s. The percentage 
of public investment financed by EU funds has been rising since 1985, reaching average 
values of 42% for Portugal and 15% for Spain. Moreover, the European Commission has 
estimated that the impact of EU structural funds on GDP growth and employment has 
been significant: in 1999, GDP rose 9.9% in Portugal and 3.1% in Spain. These funds, 
which amount to just over one-third of the EU budget, have contributed significantly to 
reduce regional disparities and foster convergence within the EU. As a result, major 
infrastructural shortcomings have been addressed and road and telecommunications 
networks have improved dramatically both in quantity and quality. In addition, increased 
spending on education and training have contributed to upgrade the labor force. In sum, 
these funds have played a prominent role in developing the factors that improve the 
competitiveness and determine the potential growth of the least developed regions of both 
countries.
xxxv We have seen, however, that new member states should not expect the same 
level of aid. Therefore, adjustment costs will higher and it will take them longer to catch 
up. 
 
Nevertheless, while acknowledging the critical role played by EU funds in the success 
of Iberian integration, it is also important to stress that successful integration is not only a 
budgetary issue. On the contrary, the Iberian experience demonstrates that the main 
benefits of integration derive from the opportunities it generates in terms of trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Portugal and Spain show that a critical factor to 
determine the final outcome of integration will depend on the pattern of investment, 
which should bring about important dynamic effects. Dynamic effects should be more 
important than static ones. Indeed, the opening up to international trade improves the 
potential for growth, lowers production costs and reduces the risk premium in response to 
a brighter macroeconomic outlook, which results from economic reforms. These 
developments help account for the increases in FDI in Portugal and Spain (where it 
reached a peak of 2.7% of GDP in 1990). FDI, in turn, has had very positive implications 
for the Iberian economies because it has facilitated the transmission of technology, has 
paved the way for advances in productivity and has thereby fostered an increase in the 
potential GDP growth of both economies.  27
The difficulties the Iberian economies experienced in the early 1990s provide an 
additional lesson for new members, namely that ‘automatic pilots’ do not work. The 
credibility of monetary and economic authorities cannot be built up by linking it to semi-
rigid institutional mechanisms (as Spain and, to a lesser extent, Portugal tried to do in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s with EMS membership). On the contrary, it has to be earned 
through the adequate management of existing discretionary powers. Furthermore, the 
Iberian EMU integration shows that the consolidation of integration processes is 
contingent on the adequate coordination of macroeconomic policies among members 
prior to the (possible) adoption of a monetary currency. In Portugal and Spain EU 
integration required a set of measures including increased competition, the privatization 
of public enterprises, industrial restructuring and deregulation. These measures translated 
into efficiency gains, which were reinforced by a more stable macroeconomic 
framework. At the same time, lower inflation and fiscal consolidation led to lower real 
(and nominal) interest rates, which, in turn, resulted in a higher sustainable growth. 
However, there have also been short-term costs associated with monetary integration. 
Indeed, the losses of the exchange rate and of monetary sovereignty require a process of 
nominal convergence and fiscal consolidation, as well as higher cyclical correlation, for 
Euro membership to be successful. This should be taken into account for the Eastern 
European economies. 
 
The Iberian enlargement also shows that prior to monetary integration, candidates 
must carry out a process of modernization and nominal convergence without fixing their 
exchange rate. An additional lesson is that the reform of financial institutions does not 
necessarily bring about institutional changes in other areas (e.g., the labor market and 
fiscal policies). The virtual collapse of the European Monetary System in 1992, caused in 
part by successive devaluations of the Iberian currencies, showed the limits of financial 
and monetary instruments to impose institutional reforms in other areas and to balance 
domestic and external economic objectives. Institutional reforms require active policies 
by the governments that are willing to pay the short-term political price for unpopular 
policies. The jury is still out regarding the domestic institutional impact of EMU. 
 
One of the important lessons to be learnt from the Iberian enlargement should be that 
economic success drives public opinion. In Iberia the greatest consensus elicited towards 
the EU is largely instrumental. The image of a ‘European community’ among Iberian 
people is very week. Indeed, they perceive the EU as an economic community, not so 
much as a community of Europeans. The Eurobarometer and CIS polling data show that 
the perceptions of Iberian citizens about the personal and collective benefits derived from 
EU membership are one of the key factors that help explain their attitudes towards the 
process of European integration. Hence, approval of Europe seems to coincide with the 
economic cycles: low during economic recessions and high during periods of economic 
growth. 
 
Finally, while Portugal and Spain had feverishly pursued their integration in the 
Community, the effects of EU integration have not always been favorable to the two 
countries. As we have seen, in manufacturing and in agriculture there has been both trade 
diversion and trade creation, implying further adjustment problems, since greater import  28
penetration led to a contraction in domestic production. This was particularly true in the 
case of the Iberian manufacturing sector. Factors such as exchange rate movements and 
the strategies of multinational companies with subsidiaries in both countries also played a 
critical role in the final outcome of integration. This analysis proves that the expected 
static effects, which were not always favorable to Spain and Portugal, should not be the 
main economic expectation behind the ten countries’ entry to the EU. Based on the 
Iberian experience, dynamic effects, on the contrary, provide an important rationale for 
supporting integration. Over the long term, they will affect the new member states’ rate 
of economic growth, which will be largely influenced by investment patterns, by the 
efficiency with which these resources are used and, finally, by their distributional effects 
among regions. 
 
Conclusions 
 
While the short-term outlook can be difficult, the economies of the candidate countries 
have already been transformed by the prospects of EU entry. From an economic 
standpoint, although central and eastern European countries have a low GDP per capita, 
they are growing very fast (and certainly faster than most of the EU economies). For the 
new members a key benefit will be additional FDI (currently 78% of the investment in 
the ten member states comes from the EU). Market-oriented reforms have also taken 
place over the past decade in all ten countries and they have been compounded by private 
investment, including FDI. As a result, the private sector in many of the ten countries is 
flourishing and showing a significant resourcefulness in competitive markets. The 
European Commission has estimated that membership could help raise the annual 
economic growth rate of these ten countries by an extra 1.3% to 23.1%. In addition, these 
countries already compare well in surveys of global competitiveness vis-à-vis EU 
members (e.g., the World Economic Forum ranks Hungary and Estonia above Portugal, 
and Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Poland above Greece). Long-term prospects for 
growth are also good because of the region’s low-cost labor, its skilled workers and its 
proximity to western European export markets. These countries have become quite 
flexible because the drive to dismantle the Communist apparatus has led to the 
development of a more open administrative environment than in many EU countries and 
greater labor flexibility.
xxxvi Moreover, producers from the new member states will now 
have access not only to their respective national markets but also to the European market. 
This will offer incentives for investment and will allow the development of economies of 
scale which, in turn, should result in more competitive products in the European markets. 
Furthermore, nationals of these states will become European citizens, thus ending some 
of the discrimination currently suffered by emigrants. Finally, access to the EU cohesion 
and structural funds will facilitate the accession of new members. Indeed, the structural 
and cohesions funds and the CAP (limited as they will be) are powerful support 
instruments to mitigate the negative impact of accession. 
 
For the Iberian countries and the new central and eastern European member states the 
EU symbolizes modernization and democracy. In the Iberian Peninsula, the European 
integration process has facilitated the reincorporation of both countries to the 
international arena, contributed to the legitimacy of the new democratic regimes, acted as  29
a buffer in controversial issues (such as decentralization in Spain and the implementation 
of economic reforms) and has facilitated and accelerated the process of convergence and 
modernization of financial, commercial and manufacturing structures. The idea of Europe 
became a driving force that moved reforms forward and was a fundamental factor for 
bringing together political stabilization, economic recovery and democratic consolidation. 
As we look to future research agendas, it is important to stress that while the majority of 
the research in this project has focused on the policy effects and the influence of EU 
policies on the Iberian countries, it is also imperative to study the impact of EU 
membership on domestic institutions.
xxxvii 
 
Despite all the significant progress accomplished over one and a half decades, the 
Iberian countries still have considerable ground to cover. At a time in which the 
European Commission is reporting that the EU is ‘losing the battle on competitiveness,’ 
in a list of 44 indicators, including economic performance, reform, employment and 
research, Portugal and Spain (together with Greece) are among the worst-performing 
countries in the majority of these areas.
xxxviii Lack of political willingness to reform and 
sluggish growth will further hinder the convergence process. At the same time, 
differences in economic performance will be exacerbated within the EU by the accession 
of the central and eastern European states. Indeed, with the entry of the new ten member 
states, there is an increasing risk of a ‘two-tier’ Europe, where some countries will do 
better than others. The EU has limited direct powers to enforce outcomes. The 
experiences of Portugal and Spain show that the influence of indirect EU 
recommendations on policy and demonstration effects has been greater than direct action. 
Hence, it is not surprising that European states, and particularly the Iberian countries, are 
failing to live up to the ambitious targets established in the European Council of Lisbon 
in March of 2000, which aimed at making the EU more competitive.
xxxix While EU 
membership will facilitate (and in many cases ameliorate) adjustment costs and will 
provide impetus for reforms, the experience of the Iberian countries shows that this is no 
substitute for the domestic implementation of reforms, which should proceed further in 
areas such as labor, product and capital markets. The success of enlargement and 
institutional reforms will hinge to a considerable degree on the ability of European 
leaders to implement reforms in the face of domestic resistance and increasing skepticism 
about enlargement.
  The enlargement process and the new convention will largely 
determine the future of Europe. Lack of progress will bring institutional paralysis and 
loss of competitiveness. The survival of the European model is at stake. 
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xxxv See Sebastian, Miguel, 2001: ‘Spain in the EU: Fifteen Years May Not be Enough’ p. 25-26. 
xxxvi For instance, according to the WEF, starting a company in Poland takes three permits compared with an 
average of five in France and ten in Italy. See ‘Into the west,’ in Financial Times, Monday, July 22, 2002. In contrast, 
Spain is listed by the European Commission as the country in which the costs of creating a business are the highest 
(1,572 euros compared with an EU average of 250), and the second in which the process is slowest (24 days, twice the 
EU average, with only Italy being behind, at 35). According to the Commission, some of the key difficulties include 
administrative barriers, difficult access to financing, bankruptcy provisions, employment protection, discrimination 
against women and inadequate education and training. 
xxxvii See Morlino 2002. 
xxxviii See ‘The EU “is losing battle on competitiveness”,’ in Financial Times, Monday, January 13, 2003, p.3. 
Spain has lost three positions (and is listed at number 20) in the last Globalization Index published by Foreign Policy 
(January/February 2003, no. 134, p. 60) and Portugal is listed in 14
th place. In addition, the World Economic Forum has 
placed Spain and Portugal among the least competitive countries in the European Union (with only Greece behind) in 
its Report on Global Competitiveness. This report examines economic conditions in 80 countries focusing on two main 
indexes: MICI (Microeconomic Competitiveness Index), which measures the quality of business development, and the 
GCI (Growth Competitiveness Index), which examines growth prospects in five-eight years based on macroeconomic 
stability. 
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